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Abstract— The paper deals with the problem of finding re-
lative values for species in the case of biodiversity conservation 
in a cultural landscape. We use the concept of shadow prices to 
derive flexible functional forms that allow us to conduct an in-
teractive and internal valuation process. The paper is organi-
zed such as that (1) the theory of shadow price derivation is 
presented in a framework of programming. (2) We obtain qua-
dratic objective functions for participant in the valuation pro-
cess. (3) Quasi demand and supply functions are derived from 
which we can simulate a market. (5) The special role of ecolo-
gists as experts and potential managers of a landscape is ad-
dressed and (6), or finally, a balanced solution on values, value 
oriented management, and species prevalence is provided. 
Keywords— Valuation, cultural landscape, species 
composition and nature provision by farms.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
This paper makes a contribution to the problem of 
cost effective integration of ecological and economic 
concerns in landscape management. A concise and   
more realistic theoretical background for biodiversity 
management in cultural landscapes, which is value 
oriented, nature favouring, and less conflicting, has 
not been obtained so far. Especially because of dis-
sents in thinking of value and valuation [1] problems 
exist. Problems with the willingness to pay approach 
[2], which gives, usually, only vague priority settings 
[3], are manifold and new approaches are needed. 
Economists [4] prefer individualistic approaches of 
cost-benefit-analyses and they see limited tasks for ex-
perts (ecologists), though reality is different. Ecologi-
sts criticize economists to be to narrow on values [5]. 
It is the aim of this paper to find a better approach 
which allows detailed valuation of species. The prob-
lem is specified as landscape management problem for 
biodiversity conservation in farm lands using the 
knowledge of experts, i.e. real managers. Ecological 
experts are considered managers of biodiversity on be-
half of citizens, though they face financial constraints 
if farmers want money for compliance with regula-
tions. Then paper is organized along a general outline 
of shadow price, behavior and equilibrium finding.    
II. GENERAL OUTLINE OF SHADOW PRICES  
In this section we deal with the general economic 
problem of minimizing costs given physical objectives 
to be fulfilled. Physical objectives become value ori-
ented and measured in costs. The target is a vector, 
biodiversity “s”. The issue is how to measure a value 
“λe” of target “s” and get “λe·s”, i.e. revenue type of 
value function given costs/constraints. Note “λe” de-
pends on structures how we set up “ecologically moti-
vated” activities “e”. Presumably “e” is a control vari-
able that is influenced by a government. Through “c”, 
pursuing ecological objectives “s”, costs are transpar-
ent; where “c” is cost and “p” is financial gain. Then:  
 
Min                                                    (1)  e p e c p
' ' −
where: 
e : = efforts or activities   
c : = unit costs   
p : = prices per unit or gross margins   
 
Objective (1) and constraint (2) constitute the pro-
gramming. The ecological demand “s”, as a set of 
criteria (constraint) and prescribed by a vector of spe-
cies (2), is accomplished in a territory. We use the no-
tation of Paris and Howitt [6] to make the point clear. 
In our case a species vector “s” is linked to a control 
variable “e” by a linear system (see later on aspects).      
 
e A s ≥                                                               (2) 
where: 
s : = target, i.e. species vectors   
 
And for calibration, also according to [6], we use s ≥ s.
The next step is to find a primal and dual solution 
for the technology (2). A dual solution provides a 
function of shadow prices, i.e. values. Continuing with 
the notation of dual solution, (3) maximizes the sum of 
shadow prices for constraints giving a value function 
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Max                                                     (3)  e s r e
' ' λ +
where: 
λe   : = shadow price   
 
Now we can specify prices “c” and “λe”, which 
follows a linear rule and, note, “λe”s are constrained in 
the dual optimization. The dual pricing includes 
(finds) the shadow price λe that correspond to the costs 
 
p r A c e + + ≤ λ
'                                              (4) 
 
Shadow prices are flexible with “demand vector: s”. 
The issue, for calibration, is that shadow prices of spe-
cies can not exceed a willingness to pay information, 
gathered through a survey and expressed as support 
for preservation of wildlife in agro-ecosystems: w ≥ r 
To briefly explain the benefit of the approach: the 
reader may imagine that shadow prices stand for a spe-
cies vector portraying the desired (weighted) biodiver-
sity. Knowing symmetric properties of functions, we 
can retrieve coefficients in objective functions either 
from estimating corresponding dual or primal behavi-
oural functions. Value units are costs “c”, but values λe 
stand also for “s”. In case of a quadratic utility func-
tion, we get a quadratic benefit function. Costs in this 
context might be opportunity costs of foregone profits 
due to interventions, which control farm behaviour.          
Technically, as shown by Paris and Howitt [6], the 
linear programming approach corresponds to a formu-
lation of cost equivalents incurred by the constraints. 
This gives a quadratic quasi-revenue function such as:  
 
] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ (...) ] [
' ' ' '
' '
s e A A C x e p c s
Ae e p c e p c E e
− + − = −
+ − = + − = λ π
     (5) 
 
where  λb=Cs = CAe. Since where is this linear 
relationship between the constraint and the shadow 
price, we can eliminate the constraint and get a typical 
well-behaved revenue (cost) function. In general 
terms, if we expand the problem of finding a revenue 
function, a quadratic function emerges. It means an 
evaluation of the desired vector “s” is possible if we 
use certain technology and costs. For this is: 
 







' ' λ λ λ Q Q e e Q e e p c E + + + − =  (6) 
 
In equation (6) matrices Qi can be obtained by 
maximum entropy ME [6]. As a follow up, matrices Qi 
can be derived by a single observation or more. ME is 
a quasi statistical procedure, used in cases of limited 
information [6]. ME is a method that follows a certain 
strategy of calibrating models [6] along probable sets 
of coefficients and constraints (set here by ecologists).     
III. ECOLOGY, SPACE AND MANAGEMENT    
Then entering into a real exercise of valuation, que-
stions, to be solved, are: how to 1. integrate ecological 
concerns for wildlife into a farming area, 2. evaluate 
nature in this context, and 3. derive the necessary in-
terface. We work with a spatial “nature production 
function”. The concept is based on a deliberate plan-
ning for eco-system services and associates nature pri-
marily with changes in field structures of landscapes 
[7]. To model interactions, system compartments have 
to be interactively modelled by explicitly defined in-
terfaces such as spatial units in nature (see soon). We 
use a stylized spatial representation (Fig.. 1 and 2). In 
this respect the paper makes suggestions how to com-
promise and provide a realistic approach for mana-










Fig. 2: Traditional land use structure        
 
The corresponding is a spatial outlay of farms and 
fields (Fig.3); it can be translated into vectors. Vectors 
can be large. Additionally we need information on cur-
rent design [7] as a reference and departure. From a  
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Fig3: Stylized structure of landscape  
 
technical point [7] the above setup fits a mathematical 
scheme which contains “effort” (activities) of farmers.   
 
x e s x e
' ' Ξ + Ξ =                                                   (7) 
 
Where: e=[a-a0,b-b0,y-y0,u,l]. Remarks on variables 
and the possibility to get function (4) are necessary. 
For a depiction of different species scenarios and a 
calibration, we either can take an initial situation as a 
reference or artificially simulate reference situations.  
For applications each element in the above formula 
must be explained. I.e.: 1. For the first segment we 
introduce “buffer strips: uo” and argue that an increase 
of strips “u” augments the possibility of suitable 
habitats for “s”. 2. We consider current strips c0 and 
ask how nature improves if more labour “l” is added. 
Since labour is proportional to strips, strip sizes can be 
reduced if farmers work more. 3. Investigating the size 
of fields (awb, we take into account the important result 
of landscape ecology that an increase in the number of 
fields (a decline in the size: a-a0) increases the number 
of edges and diversity of fields and cropping patterns 
increase biodiversity [8]. 4. We include change in in-
tensity (y-y0) as positively correlated with herbs in “s”.  
IV. NATURE SUPPLY BY FARMERS 
The aim is to get an elaborated necessary payment 
scheme for activities “e” which are given by “c”. If we 
use a quadratic exposition of the programming of farm 
behaviour [7], the noticeable change in farm behaviour 
is compensated on the basis of a deviation from an 
optimal economic plan. As can be shown [7], a conci-
se depiction of the objective of farmers is again a qua-
dratic function resulting in a modelling approach (8): 
 
 
z e q e e e q












] [ 5 . ] [
] [ 5 . (.)
Π − + Π + −
Π − + − − + = π π
       (8) 
 
Then a supply system for “s” can be derived from 
the specification if derivatives to e and q, being taken: 
 




1 = Π + − Π + − = ∂ ∂ z e q p q P π                  (9a) 
0 ] [ / 3 3 1 2 = Π − Π + − Π − − = ∂ ∂ z e e q c e P π         (9b) 
 
Eliminating “q” gives is a linear representation of 
the behaviour a farm community with respect to in-
centives “c”. Note “c” is a now payment (structure); 
but “cwe” is also costs of pursuing ecologist’s interests 
 
z c e f f f 2 , 1 , Π + Π + =π                                         (10) 
 
This relationship specifies interaction of “q” and “e” 
whereas “e” is determining “q”. Additionally we can 
summarize all exogenous variables to xf, incl. output 
prices, etc.; i.e. exogenous variables xf include farm 
“economics”, and we can match farm behaviour in: 
 
x z c s x f f f e
'
2 , 1 ,
' ] [ Ξ + Π + Π + Ξ = π             (11) 
 
Similarly solving in (9b) for “q” gives a, by ecologi-
sts and citizens moderated and preferred, farming sys-
tem (or supply of farm produces) which matches with 
references of citizens. For instance, it may include me-
adows. If this is of concern it has implication for the 
landscape since policy changes cropping patterns, for 
example introducing grass land; we see that later.  
V. MARGINAL WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
To be consistent with the above approach we pre-
sume that a certain overall willingness to pay exists, 
though it has now to be derived from a “constructed” 
consumer. The basic idea is that a consumer or visitor 
appreciates a certain set of species appearing as been 
designed by ecologists. For instance a willingness to 
pay may have been detected for a nice landscape, 
though this can not be directly attributed to species 
and design. Rather researchers have to infer the eva-
luation from observation. To construct such a decision 
framework of citizens we presume that a preference 
order for utility is given be by a certain wish criterion 
“a”: for example, an index of satisfaction with a walk. 
It can be constructed and is composed of a component 
of 1. private goods, delivered by tourist industry “z”, 
2. species or nature appearance “s”, delivered by natu-
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re conservation units, and 3. landscape quality “q”, 
delivered by farms; “q” is included  as farming system. 
 
a q s z cx cs cz ≥ Θ + Θ + Θ                                   (12) 
 
Visitors minimize costs (primal) given the constra-
int of index of achievements by their visit to be met.   
 
Min !                                                       (13a)  } {
' z p
s.t.    } ] {[
' ' z q s z a cx cs cz ζ τ + Θ + Θ + Θ −
 
and the corresponding dual is  
 
Max !  (13b)  } ] {[
' ' z q s z a cx cs cz ζ τ + Θ + Θ + Θ −
s.t.    p cz ≤ Θ τ
'
 
After solving the problem, a corresponding utility 
function which follows the above concept of construc-
ting quadratic benefit functions is obtained depending 
on shadow prices. Activity levels of a constrained vec-
tor of index “a” are obtainable. “τ” provides marginal 
values and demand function “z”. Both are dependent 
on levels of species as well as landscape appearance. 
 





' 5 . 5 . ) , ( Ψ + Ψ + Ψ = τ τ τ τ                    (14) 
 
Subtracting marginal equations after optimisation 
gives a solution for a demand function of “s”. As 
dependent on the shadow price, index, and type of 
agriculture, it can be calculated as residual response 
 










1 Ψ + Ψ + Ψ + Ψ = Ψτ                             (15) 
 
By representation (15) a “derived demand” for spe-
cies (and landscape) can be established. It depicts pay-
ments of citizens as dependent on internal pricing of 
shadow prices τ for constraint “s”; i.e. design matters.  
VI. ECOLOGISTS AS MANAGERS  
Now, the objective of a manager has to be integra-
ted. By integration we intend to get a “balanced” bio-
diversity between farmers as suppliers, citizens as 
users and ecologists as mediators; though there are 
conflicting interests. Citizens want to pay few for big 
results showing their preferences. Farmers want to 
change little but receive high payments. Ecologists 
want to have a nature that is following their science 
based knowledge. They want to spend much but nor-
mally may receive small money. However, the diffi-
culty is to match the different perspectives in a desired 
vector of species as valuation problem. As shown, the 
expert’s preference function can be expressed in terms 
of unit costs “c” and the stated objective “s”.  
For this we start modifying the analysis and think 
there is a deviation between ecologists’ perspective sn 
and citizens perspective sc. An ecologist’s preference 
function is based on sn; it can be expressed in terms of 
unit costs “c” for measures and stated vector becoming:  
 











' 5 . 5 . Φ + Φ + Φ + Φ + Φ =  (16)
   
 
The ecologist is the citizens’ agent, though he wants 
to do more. His decisive problem is to determine the 
“correct” s and c along an “equilibrium” or balance. 
As said, we may distinguish the provision of biodi-
versity through experts, who follow the nature driven 
concept “sn”, and consumer/ citizen concept “sc”. For a 
compromise we see the expert following the approach 
to get money by offering “sc” and immolating “sd”, a 
deviation, in his preference function. Though he main-
tains his knowledge, he pretends. The question is 
always how approaches are linked to the costs “c”. We 
introduced vectors that enable us to depict the 
conducted pursue of wishes from a preference 
function.  .  d c n s s s + =
Note it expresses the species vector of the nature 
expert as citizens’ preference plus deviation. As an 
assumption the citizens’ preference is exogenous to 
the ecologist. He gets information from the willing-
ness to pay which is quantity “sc” multiplied by (sha-
dow) price “τ”. The decisive thing is that the agency 
(ecologist) conducts the final, now quadratic, version 
of a flexible benefit function as an agency that should 
pursue a “public” task, though by deviation it (“she”) 
follows expert knowledge. Remember, the benefit 
function contains already knowledge of the ecological 
expert. Then we supplement the preference by two 
aspects: (a) labour costs and (b) a profit or surplus.       
A surplus element C(ι,l) is considered as a bonus for 
working in nature conservation. Benefits shall mar-
ginally succeed costs. Now let us assume the eco-
logical expert has to pursue a different vector of pre-
ferred nature vector sc due to budget constraints to be 
met. It traverses sc, “preferred”, into the ecologists’ 
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frame sn, “needed”. Inserting this measurement for a 
citizen oriented governance is equivalent to a bio-
diversity index. The wished ecologist’s governance is: 
 
) 17 ( ) , ( ] ] [ [
] [ 5 .
















l C l d e A p c s
x c x s s l d c c
c s s s s s s s G
c c f
e b e b d c n b
b d c d c b d c b c
ι τ λ + − − − +
Φ + Φ + + − Φ +
Φ + + + Φ + Φ =
The amended objective function (17) contains finan-
cial aspects as a budget constraint. We get an expert 
objective function which is the ecologist’s interest 
function, but conveys public welfare. It recognizes the 
requested delivery for citizens as exogenous. Function 
(17) can be optimized to sd and λf which means that 
the deviation is minimized. This gives the stake of the 
nature experts as marginal objective (interest) function. 
 






1 = − − Φ + Φ + + Φ = ∂ ∂ f e b b d c b d p c x c s s s G λ  (18a) 
0 ] ] [ ] [ /
' ' ' = − + − − = ∂ ∂ l d s s A p c s G d c c c f τ λ  (18b) 
 
In this system the second equations is multiplicative 
in “τwsc” and [c’– p’]A[sc+sd]]; it is non-linear. But we 
can approximate it using a reference and Taylor 
approximation, because we look for deviations. Then 
 








1 = Φ + Φ + Φ + Φ e b b b c b x c s τ
 
is the behaviour of the ecologist as being the coor-
dinating and designing agency following its expertise.  
VII. EQULIBRIUM  
Finally we can use the equations as tool to derive a 
simulated equilibrium for valuation of shadow prices. 
In the above outline we derived a system of five 
equation with c, λe, τ, sd and sc as endogenous variab-
les. For the derivation of variables a matrix algebra is 
can be used or the equations are inserted to each other. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK  
In the above outline we derived objective (interest) 
functions of participants in a landscape design to be 
publicly managed. The objectives have to be integra-
ted. Hereby we intend to get a “balanced” biodiversity 
and evaluation as jointly done by farmers as suppliers, 
citizens as users and, importantly, ecologists as man-
agers. Therefore we applied shadow prices adjust-
ments based on scarcity. Note there are conflicting in-
terests. Citizens want to pay few for big results show-
ing their preferences. Farmers want to change little but 
receive high payments. Ecologists want to have a na-
ture following their science based concept of ecologi-
cal knowledge and spent little money, even having 
money at all. The difficulty is to match different as-
pirations discerning the “equilibrium” of species. We 
suggested doing matching by shadow price analysis.  
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